Public Reason: Vol. 10, No. 1, 2018
Rawlsian Stability and the Hazards of Envy
Alexandros Manolatos
This paper explores the role of envy in the third part of A Theory of Justice and challenges a wide-spread game-theoretic view of stability. The proponents of this view see Rawls’s account of stability as an attempt to solve a collective action problem. I claim that Rawls treats the development of envious feelings as a distinct source of instability which is not part of a collective action problem and has to be addressed separately. My thesis entails that we shouldn’t read the congruence between the right and the good as the culmination of Rawls’s overall argument for stability. This reading is supported by the revised account of stability in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement and leads to a better understanding of Rawls’s political turn.
Key words: Rawls, stability, envy, game-theory, Weithman, congruence.
Alexandros Manolatos. 2018. Rawlsian Stability and the Hazards of Envy. <em>Public Reason</em> 10 (1): 33-48.

Citation

Alexandros Manolatos. 2018. Rawlsian Stability and the Hazards of Envy. Public Reason 10 (1): 33-48.