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Patriotism, Liberalism, Cosmopolitanism and Globalization

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Abstract. Globalization is a challenge for the way individuals relate to their own identity in the political context of the nation-state. At the same time, the pursuit of moral ideals such as equality and social justice is still conditioned by the existence of the nation-state. Is patriotism still valid if we want to build a personal identity appropriate to a global society or is it necessary to give it up in favor of something more comprehensive that meets the moral challenges of a global society? This article attempts to provide a framework for answering this question, starting from the premises that can be found in versions of liberal nationalism and cosmopolitanism.

Key words: nationalism, cosmopolitanism, globalization, patriotism, personal identity.

The feeling of patriotism represents "one's love and loyalty to one's own country" (Tan 2004, 137). The phenomenon of globalization has not diminished the feeling many individuals have of belonging to a certain nation or of solidarity with others living within the same national borders, i.e. in the nation-state. Patriotism continues to be relevant in motivating the actions of individuals as moral and political actors, and national identity is one of the main components of individual identity. At the same time, the pursuit of moral ideals such as equality and social justice is still conditioned by the existence of the nation-state. Whereas David Miller (2007) considers that national identity and patriotism do not hinder the achievement of such moral ideals, some views have challenged such ideas, for example:

> […] This emphasis on patriotic pride is both morally dangerous and, ultimately, subversive of some of the worthy goals patriotism sets out to serve – for example, the goal of national unity in devotion to worthy moral ideals of justice and equality. (Nussbaum 2002, 4)

Martha Nussbaum maintains that, in contemporary societies, cosmopolitanism, which supports a global community of human beings, is somehow less ambiguous than patriotism. In such a view, cosmopolitanism is more suitable for pursuing moral values such as equality and social justice, considering the following reasoning:

> […] If our moral natures and our emotional natures are to live in any sort of harmony, we must find devices through which to extend our strong emotions and our ability to imagine the situation of others to the world of human life as a whole. (Nussbaum 2002, xiii)

Thus, on the one hand, nationalists argue that patriotism, as part of the national identity of individuals, together with the nation-state, are not dangerous and subversive and do not prevent the realization of moral ideals such as equality and justice in the context of today's globalized society. On the other hand, proponents of

cosmopolitanism see in the globalized society an opportunity to test their own views of a global society of fellow-citizens. A global society offers the opportunity for individuals to show solidarity as citizens of the world and better conditions to achieve their moral ideals of social justice and equality. In the context of the antagonism of the two main ideological positions, I think we can raise certain questions, such as: are moral ideals, e.g. social equality and justice, served only by patriotism and within national borders or rather can they be served equally well by cosmopolitanism and within a global society? Is patriotism an obsolete political emotion, or can it still contribute to shaping and fulfilling moral ideals of the new generations? Is patriotism dangerous and subversive or, on the contrary, does it support the achievement of individuals' moral goals better than cosmopolitanism with its claim of an all-encompassing empathy for all human beings living on the planet?

I. NATIONAL BORDERS AND ETHICAL COMMUNITIES

When discussing moral ideals such as equality or social justice in contemporary society, a relevant question arises about the organizational framework in which these ideals can be acquired. Proponents of nationalism argue that the existence of national borders, i.e. of the nation-state, is practically a necessary constraint for achieving such ideals, while proponents of cosmopolitanism believe that national borders do not play any important role in accepting, designing and implementing moral ideals. From the perspective of nationalism, national identity as a relationship of solidarity between the citizens of a state is a better basis for accepting the constraints resulting from the application of principles of different moral conceptions and for actions that lead to their implementation. The sense of justice does not only determine accepting different moral principles, but also the feelings, the emotions we share with those closest to us. For example, in his book *On Nationality* David Miller considers nations as "ethical communities" (1995, 11) and maintains that:

> […] a proper account of ethics should give weight to national boundaries, and that in particular there is no objection in principle to institutional schemes – such as welfare states – that are designed to deliver benefits exclusively to those who fall within the same boundaries as ourselves. (1995, 11)

From this perspective, the state in general and the nation as a form of solidarity are at least one of the effective ways to achieve moral ideals. As Miller said, noting the ways in which some peoples in Eastern Europe, aiming to promote their own well-being after the fall of communism, separated from larger into smaller states:

> Provided, then, that we endorse ideals of social justice, and recognize that these take hold mainly within national communities, we have good reason for wanting the political systems that can realize these ideals to coincide with national boundaries. (1995, 85)

This could mean that only within national borders human solidarity gains the necessary intensity to accept and promote moral ideals, such as those relating to equality and social justice. At the same time, the moral commitment of individuals to certain sets of rules and institutions is based on other elements such as common territory, common language, common culture, a common social and historical experience, etc. In this sense, we can consider, along with Miller, nations as ethical communities. Globally, we can speak only in a metaphorical sense of such an ethical community for all human beings. Against Miller, however, we can accept that feelings of empathy, the capacity to understand what is common to all people, certain emotions towards the underprivileged and the worst-off, and even a sense of fairness and justice that derives from the moral status of human beings – all these should be conceivable and functioning in a consmopolitan society.

II. NATION-STATE AND GLOBALIZATION

The term nation-state, often used in political theory, implies a fusion of the concept of state with that of nation and refers to a certain political entity with a certain geographical territory administered by a legitimate and recognized central authority. In relation to this nation-state, individuals nurture a sense of belonging to a nation and patriotism. At the same time, within a nation-state individuals share prevalent feelings and attitudes towards moral values or ideals, generated by the relations between citizens, which are rooted in their common history, language, traditions and customs. One can maintain that our world is made of nation-states, perhaps exclusively, and further argue that even in our globalized world, various peoples continue to aspire to the formation of a new nation-state, for example, Kurds, Sikhs, Saharawi people and others, considering the national state as the only institution that can respond to all their interests, so that they could benefit from all the opportunities offered by social life. However, the nation-state is an ideal type in Weber's sense, rather than a reality representing the fusion between a nation and a state. Charles Tilly (1990) underlines that nation-states as such have appeared rarely in history and its model as being based on a strong and inevitable community of history, culture and language is not exactly a concrete, a real one:

> The term national state [...] does not necessarily mean *nation*-state whose people share a strong linguistic, religious and symbolic identity. (Tilly 1990, 3; emphasis in original)

And also:

> Although states such as Sweden and Ireland now approximate that ideal, very few European national states have ever qualified as nation-states. (Tilly 1990, 3)

If we are looking at the world map, for example, the political borders of the states on the African continent have no connection with the cultural particularities of those

occupying the space within those limits (Rwodzi and Mubonderi 2015). Modern states are made up, more or less, of a majority of individuals of the same nationality, but also of groups belonging to different nationalities or ethnicities. We can conclude that if the nation-state is only an ideal model and, in reality, most nation-states are more or less heterogeneous, it is even more problematic to prove how *patriotism* – a feeling that corresponds to this ideal nation-state – and, respectively, cosmopolitanism – a feeling which corresponds to an abstract world community of all people – are compatible with the context of today's global society and favor (as feelings or emotions which refer to belonging to a national or global community) the achievement of moral ideals such as equality and justice.

When one says during the ordinary or more specialized discussions of political philosophy that patriotism is an ambiguous feeling that can be dangerous and subversive, the underlying idea is that patriotism as a political emotion specific to nationalism is in fact incompatible with the political values of a democratic and liberal society. That is why authors who value patriotism as a political emotion insist on demonstrating its compatibility with a liberal political vision.

For example, attempting to show that nationalism is open to the universal value of liberalism, Yael Tamir tries to reconcile nationalism with liberalism. In her approach, she tries to remove certain prejudices regarding the incompatibility between liberalism and nationalism and to defend nationalism from misinterpretations that see it as a historically limited conception belonging to a revolute political order. In order to understand Tamir's approach, we should not neglect also that her view crystallized around and immediately after the fall of communism, when the young states of Eastern Europe, especially those of the former USSR, associated the reinvigoration of the national states with their hopes for democratization and welfare. Moreover, at that time and after, these states valued globalization as an opportunity for strengthening their statehood, as well as for social progress and development. Tamir defines the complementarity between liberalism and nationalism as follows:

> The main characteristic of liberal nationalism is that it fosters national ideals without losing sight of other human values against which national ideals ought to be weighed. The outcome of this process is a redefinition of legitimate national goals and the means used to pursue them. Liberal nationalism thus celebrates the particularity of culture together with the universality of human rights, the social and cultural embeddedness of individuals together with their personal autonomy. In this sense it differs radically from organic interpretations of nationalism, which assume that the identity of individuals is totally constituted by their national membership, and that their personal will is "truly free" only when fully submerged in the general one.[…] Liberal nationalism relies on the assumption that as liberalism is a theory about the eminence of individual liberties and personal autonomy, nationalism is a theory about the eminence of national-cultural membership and historical continuity, and the importance of perceiving one's present life and one's future development as an experience shared with others. (1993, 79)

One may agree upon the abovementioned definition of liberal nationalism. However, one may also ask whether this historically circumstantiated type of cultural characteristic of a social model and its main political institutions should be normatively extrapolated to the global sphere. Through the processes of globalization, society has undergone a multitude of significant changes. The global sphere is no longer the sphere of citizens belonging only to their national states as national citizens were before the starts of globalization process. The new technologies, the new communication channels, the Internet and social media, the development of international air travels, education abroad, the new forms of migration as voluntary migration, diasporas as transnational communities, as well as network communities between migrants and their family left home, have led to a global context that has transcended and almost made irrelevant the borders of nation-states. The new relationships between individuals, facilitated by these changes and the others, have contributed to the emergence of new attitudes toward the global context. If so, there are some reasons to believe that individuals may have true fellow-feeling with people who do not belong to the same nation-state as them and that this context accommodates the possibility for them to share fellow-feelings and attitudes with the other individuals who make up the global sphere. These new attitudes are different from the feelings of belonging to a nation-state and normatively have new significations irreducible to the feeling related to the membership to nation-state. Globalization "[…] creates new types of experiences associated with risk-taking, experimentation, and self-expression" (Svašek and Skrbiš 2007, 372). In their book *The New Individualism: The Emotional Costs of Globalization* Anthony Elliott and Charles Lemert show that a new individualism involves "*ongoing emotional struggles* to relate internal and external experience in which both processes and structures of self-definition are explicitly examined, revised and transformed." (2006, 72; emphasis in original), while Ulf Hannerz maintains that:

> There are new various kind of people for whom the nation works less well as source of cultural resonance [...]. It seems rather that in the present phase of globalization is the proliferation of kinds of ties that can be transnational: ties to kin, friend, colleagues, business associates, and others. In all that variety, such ties may entail a kind and a degree of turning out, a weakened personal involvement with nations and national culture, a shift for the disposition to take it for granted […]. (1996, 89)

Ulf Hannerz also notes that:

> [...] In their great diversity, these outside linkages tend not to coalesce into any single conspicuous alternative to the nation. The people involved are not all "cosmopolitans" in the same sense; most of them are probably not cosmopolitans in any precise sense at all. (1996, 89)

Considering these new descriptions of the global sphere the following question can be asked legitimately: can liberal nationalism provide a normative framework for these global attitudes of individuals?

Liberal nationalism attempts to achieve a conceptual coherence between the values of nationalism, such as patriotism and those of liberalism, such as individual rights:

> Liberal nationalism is predicated on the idea that all nations should enjoy equal rights, and in fact derives its universal structure from the theory of individual rights found at its core. If national rights rest on the value that individuals attach to their membership in a nation, then all nations are entitled to equal respect. The justification of national rights is thus separated from the glorious or tormented past of each nation, from its antiquity, or from its success in attaining territorial gains. (Tamir 1993, 9)

In this view, the nation-state has certain rights similar to the individual ones. States have rights, such as the right to self-determination, to manage their own affairs autonomously, to protect their citizens and borders and other rights that are regulated by international law, by international conventions and treaties, which are guaranteed by international law (Buchanan 2004). But the nature of these state rights is entirely different from the individual liberal rights as those settled under the concept of negative liberty, for example, *habeas corpus* or the right to freedom of movement. Those rights regard the relation between individuals and the state as coercive power while state rights are the rights of a sovereign power in relation to the citizens and other states. That is why an extrapolation or transfer of individual rights to the state is somehow inappropriate. For instance, one cannot simply say that "if national rights are grounded on the value that individuals bestow to their belonging to a nation, then all nations are entitled to be equally respected." (Tamir 1993, 9) We can have moral consideration and respect for each individual. But we cannot infer from this an entitlement of the state to be respected, for example, by other states. Individuals can identify with any national community and can be respected as being member of these national communities, but it is inappropriate to conclude from this that the nation-state deserves the respect of others. Nor does it imply in any way that the actions of such a state will necessarily be appropriate and in full compliance with international regulations or even with the aims and interests of its citizens. If a nation-state does not respect civil liberties, then a state does not deserve respect regardless of whether or not its citizens identify with it.

Tamir also tries to substantiate this theory by making a demarcation between the nation-state understood as a political system and the nation-state understood as a cultural system, believing that this demarcation would make the characteristics of liberal nationalism clearer:

> [...] Most contemporary states are multinational, and under these circumstances, the demand that a state should reflect one national culture entails harsh implications for members of minority groups. Drawing a line between the political and the cultural spheres could serve to alleviate some of the problems raised by multinationalism. (Tamir 1993, 10)

Tamir also noticed that:

> [...] the liberal state has in practice continued to operate within the constitutive assumptions of the modern nation-state and to see itself as a community with a distinctive culture, history, and collective destiny. The growing dissatisfaction of ethnic groups and national minorities living within liberal states lends persuasive support to this claim. Members of these minorities feel excluded from the public sphere because they realise that it achieves an appearance of dis- interest in cultural issues by exclusion, namely, by rejecting all those who do not belong to the dominant culture. (1993, 141)

Thus, Tamir argues that the multinational or multi-ethnic state should be characterized by an open political culture, which allows minorities of any kind to live freely within their culture in society and to choose from their culture a moral identity or adhere to a national identity. This seems to be an adequate description of a liberal institutional arrangement for which the plurality of cultures is thus a valuable resource to all human beings (Tamir 1993, 33). Nevertheless, individuals chose their plan of life or other similar goals based on a variety of reasons, political, cultural, and religious according their circumstantiated desires or interests. Yet, from the existence of this mechanism of choosing under a determined cultural context, Tamir deduces for individuals a right to culture as a liberal right and then considers this right a condition of possibility for nationalism and liberalism together. She also believes that the right to culture has the role of allowing individuals to live under a certain culture and to choose their own culture as well as their social affiliation, to recreate the culture of the community they live in and to redefine their borders: "to grant individuals the right to follow their culture as given, but also to re-create it." (Tamir 1993, 49) In her view, the right to culture is not a communal or collective right and were it accepted as a distinct right, it should be considered of the same nature as the right to association (1993, 44). More specifically:

> As a matter of principle, the right to practice a culture, like all other rights intended to protect the interests of individuals, is an individual right. (Tamir 1933, 45)

The right to culture is a right to a public sphere in which individuals share a language, remember their past, cherish their heroes; in short, they live a fulfilled national life (Tamir 1993, 8; 35-57). This also seems to be the arrangement liberal nationalism proposes to national states in a globalized society. Tamir suggests that the right to culture implies the free choice of the individual to follow a certain culture or another. In her view, a culture of a nation-state thus formed justifies the state's right to self-determination and can replace the political justification:

> The right of self-determination, however, stakes a cultural rather than a political claim, namely it is the right to preserve the existence of a nation as a distinct cultural entity. (Tamir 1993, 57)

Tamir distinguishes between what she calls a right to self-government and a right to self-determination. The right to self-government concerns the decision-making process, while self-determination seems to be rather a moral right aimed at autonomy. The right to self-determination, which is also applicable to nations, leads to restricted political systems, and internationally to fragmentation, even to Balkanization. In order to avoid the conflicts that would come from the prevalence of this right, then the smaller, royal and perhaps federal political organizations would be more viable and legitimated in line with national liberalism (Tamir 1993, 150 –1).

Liberal nationalism could be a very good theory for the legitimacy of the nation-state. It is problematic to determine whether it also offers a solution for the international order in the present context of globalization and particularly for the new forms of *global social life*, as I dare to call it, in which more and more citizens of nation-states take part daily. Most individuals who are part of the new games of these forms of global social life are probably not cosmopolitans, but cosmopolitanism as a view, doctrine and feeling gives them better chances to achieve their normative aspiration for equality and social justice in this new form of social life in which they are part daily. That is why cosmopolitan projects are desirable: because they argue in favor of global social relations based on moral principles and standards independent of cultural and national differences. Cosmopolitanism does not imply cultural uniformity but favors the unrestricted manifestation of individuals within a normative framework that regulates individual rights and freedoms but also moral obligations and responsibilities.

III. PATRIOTISM, COSMOPOLITANISM AND GLOBALIZATION

The cosmopolitan project is challenged by patriotism. Proponents of the former theoretically should overcome or integrate patriotism into their approaches and explain why people would choose to have similar feelings toward strangers they do not identify with, but are related to the new forms of cosmopolitan social life in which they are involved daily. One way to integrate patriotism into the way cosmopolitanism relates to globalization is Kok-Chor Tan's conception of *limited patriotism*. For Tan the feeling of patriotism represents "one's love and loyalty to one's own country." (2004, 137) Patriotism, i.e. the feeling of patriotism, explains the attachment that people have to their national origin and to their compatriots. Patriotism is the basis of social systems, because it makes sense to accept the norms and institutions of the state through the common identity and citizenship of individuals. Thus, it seems easier to achieve social cohesion based on certain expectations that arise from patriotism, on the assumption of duties and obligations and on the solidarity and reciprocity represented by patriotism. Linking a limited patriotism to the theory of cosmopolitanism can be achieved by understanding the spheres to which each refers. Patriotism is closely linked to the nations, borders, citizenship and social systems it generates. Cosmopolitanism as a feeling and concept can be approached from the perspective of global society,

which is a sphere in which norms and institutions regulate the relationships between individuals who need principles capable of dealing with the problems that arise at this level. Therefore, the two spheres, the patriotic one and the cosmopolitan one, can coexist without diminishing their effects on people's lives. An individual can love their country and, at the same time, accept that they are part of a globalized society characterized by new social relations with individuals from other nations. Individuals identify at the national level with their fellow citizens, but they can also identify with all other people in the global sphere. Thus, close relationships are established between individuals across national borders, and their feelings can generate the assumption of moral duties and responsibilities, as well as respect for the rights of others. Technology, communication, education, knowledge, circulation of information and ideas generate a global social context that does not deny the importance of national feelings but integrates them into a global sphere where we can respect the moral relevance of the other. For Tan, limited patriotism implies a conception of *justice as impartiality*:

> [...] justice as impartiality does not aim to regulate individuals' day-to-day interaction with each other as such; rather it aims to define and regulate the background social context within which such interactions occur. (2004, 157)

Tan argues that the limits of patriotism are determined by the obligations that individuals have to the nation they come from. When individuals fulfill all their obligations and tasks towards the nation-state, they have full freedom and the opportunity to choose the type of actions they wish to take, for example, in order to fulfill their obligations or the goals they assume for the benefit of individuals from any other part of the world or the duties they have in order to fulfill moral ideals such as global justice. This approach is important because it manages to combine two elements that seemed to be in a totally contradictory relationship: patriotism and individuals' obligations to the global sphere.

Thus, one can be a patriot and, at the same time, identify with fellows on a global scale and respect the principles and standards of a cosmopolitan vision on moral ideals as global justice. The two types of attitudes are not mutually exclusive, but they can build together a global society populated by individuals who respect each other beyond social, cultural or national contexts. Just as our commitment to the idea of social justice does not involve whatsoever neglecting our responsibilities to individuals to whom we have deep moral commitments (family, friends), similarly, global justice as a form of global distributive justice does not involve the elimination of national commitments such as patriotism. Tan speaks of impartiality in regulating these moral commitments to the national community and the community of all people. The impartiality proposed by Tan does not have the role of eliminating national identity, patriotism and other elements specific to the nationalist approach, but only of establishing their conditions and limits. National desires and interests can also be pursued in the global sphere, and the limits to be respected are those of justice or, in Tan's terms, impartial justice.

We can observe, through the analysis undertaken that, although patriotism and the nation-state continue to be relevant in certain contexts, this does not deny the possibility of cosmopolitan forms of moral responsibility. Of course, no global system is really a consolidated transnational culture, and it is problematic whether certain political institutions could replace the national cultures or the nation-state, offering individuals the feeling of membership they have towards national cultures and states. However, at the global level there is an indisputable global moral responsibility shared between a lot of agents starting from individuals and ending with global inter-governmental organizations. This responsibility is distinct from national moral responsibility, a type of collective responsibility that individuals assume by virtue of their membership to "those large communities we call nations." (Miller 2007, 81) At national level, in most cases, a great number of social policies have the role of supporting every citizen to lead a decent life, to have access to the necessary resources for survival, education and health care. Each of us is a member of such a system that is legally regulated and imposes certain obligations on us in connection with them. These obligations fuel our sense of responsibility, which contributes to the identification and implementation of public policies aimed at achieving moral ideals of equality and social justice and to supporting our fellow citizens who need help. Moreover,

> In everyday political discourse, we often make judgments that seem to involve holding nations responsible, or for the consequences that follow from these actions. [...] Often, when states are held accountable for the outcomes they produce, they are judged as agents of the people they are supposed to serve. (Miller 2007, 111)

We also encounter these types of judgments on moral responsibility globally. But, for the time being, global moral responsibility seems to be assumed primarily by individuals; by civil society, by international organizations only in a diffuse way. There is no comprehensive framework for uniting moral responsibilities globally, although there are countless issues from global warming to the need to eradicate extreme poverty where we may even speak of a broad consensus on initiating and taking action to address them. In connection with this global responsibility, we can once again observe the complementarity of the two spheres, national and global, and we can ask ourselves whether there is any possibility of joining them so that global responsibility emerges victorious. One solution might be that suggested by David Miller in his book *National Responsibility and Global Justice* (2007). Miller distinguishes between two concepts of responsibility and suggests a way to combine national responsibility with global responsibility: an *outcome responsibility,* which is our responsibility for our actions and decisions, and a *remedial responsibility,* which for those in need and who would need our help (2007, 81). Using this distinction related to responsibilities, we could say that in our capacity as members of the national state, these global remedial obligations correspond to our cosmopolitan sentiments that can be a pendant of patriotism.

To conclude, although patriotism is strongly manifested as a sense of belonging to the nation-state, and its legitimacy derives from our belonging to a nation and a culture, cosmopolitanism is a strong sense of responsibility we have for all people. This cosmopolitan feeling can be reflected in a remedial responsibility that could be addressed both by individuals and states for the global sphere.

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